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International Law and the Use of Force: 
May the United States Attack the Chemical 
Weapons Plant at Rabta? 
Marshall Silverberg* 
During the waning days of 1988 and continuing into 1989, the 
Reagan Administration, the news media, and the American public 
expressed increasing consternation over reports that the Libyan 
government was building a large chemical weapons plant at 
Rabta, forty miles south of Tripoli. l They based their concerns 
on a realization that such a facility, controlled by Libya's unpre-
dictable and volatile leader, Colonel M uammar Qadhafi, would 
represent a significant threat to America's national security.2 Such 
a threat seemed particularly acute, especially in view of Qadhafi's 
support of international terrorism and his vow to retaliate for 
the American bombing of Tripoli in 1986.3 
As American concerns grew, the controversy quickly escalated. 
The Reagan Administration considered several options that 
* Formerly Assistant General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency; B.A., State U. of 
New York at Binghamton (1980); J.D., L.L.M. (Int'l & Compo Law), Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center (1983, 1987); M.A. (Nat'l Sec'ty Stud.), Georgetown University (1989). 
This article has been reviewed by the CIA to assist the author in removing classified or 
otherwise privileged information. That review, however, neither constitutes CIA authen-
tication of this article as factual nor implies CIA endorsement of the author's views. The 
author used only publicly available information to write this article and had access to no rele-
vant classified information. The article reflects developments through October 25, 1989. 
I See, e.g., Markham, Bonn Sees No Proof Yet of Company's Role in Chemical-Arms Plant, 
N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1989, at A6, col. 1; Pear, U.S. Will Propose Wide U.N. Powers on 
Chemical Weapons, N. Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1989, at AI, col. 6; Engleberg & Gordon, Germans 
Accused of Helping Libya Build Nerve Gas Plant, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1989, at AI, col. 1; 
Gordon, Libya Offers to Allow Inspection of Chemical Plant but U.S. Balks, N.Y. Times, Dec. 
31, 1988, at AI, col. 1; Editorial, That Libyan Chemical Plant, Wash. Post, Dec. 27, 1988, 
at A14, col. 1; Cannon & Ottaway, New Attack on Libya Discussed, Wash. Post, Dec. 22, 
1988, at AI, col. 1. 
2 See, e.g., Cannon & Ottaway, supra note 1, at AI, col. 1; Editorial, supra note 1, at A14, 
col. 1. 
3 The American bombing of Tripoli in 1986 is discussed in Part III of this Article. See 
infra notes 63-114 and accompanying text. 
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ranged from multinational condemnation to a military attack. In 
preparation for an international conference on the prohibition 
of chemical weapons, Administration officials discussed the pos-
sibility of using military force to destroy the plant with the United 
States' NATO allies.4 At one point, a large United States Navy 
strike force sailed towards Libya.5 The Washington Post noted 
that despite the presumption that "circumstances must be very 
special in order to justify the use of force, ... [g]iven Libya's 
record of support for terrorism and the export of violence, how-
ever, one could argue that here the circumstances must be special 
in order to avoid the use of force, if it could reasonably be estab-
lished that force was the only reliable way to reduce the particular 
threat."6 
While policymakers discussed national security considerations, 
some officials and commentators questioned whether a United 
States military attack on the Rabta plant would be permissible 
under international law. Secretary of State George Shultz implied 
that an American attack would be lawful in order to prevent 
Colonel Qadhafi from using the plant to supply chemical weapons 
to terrorists or combatants. 7 Director of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) William F. Burns supported the 
Secretary by stating that the plant could be attacked pursuant to 
the United Nations Charter because the United States would be 
acting in "self-defense."8 Kenneth Adelman, Burns's predecessor 
at ACDA, reached a different conclusion, stating that interna-
tionallaw would allow the United States to attack the facility only 
if it "supplied poisons used against our country or citizens, or if 
there's an imminent threat of such use. Neither has happened."9 
To date, no commentator has extensively discussed the relevant 
considerations under international law of a U.S. attack on the 
facility at Rabta. lO The issue is important, however, for although 
4 See Cannon & Ottaway, supra note 1, at AI, col. 1. 
5 See Almond & Gertz, Navy Strike Force Heads Toward Libya, Wash. Times, Jan. 4, 1989, 
at AI, col. 3. 
6 Editorial, supra note 1, at AI4, col. 1. 
7 Shultz's View on Chemical Arms, Libya, Wash. Post, Jan. 5, 1989, at A3I, col. 6. 
8 Gordon, Senior U.S. Official Says Libyans Should Destroy Chemical Factory, N.Y. Times, 
Jan. 5, 1989, at A3, col. 1. 
9 Adelman, Qadhafi's Poison Potential, Wash. Times, Jan. 4, 1989, at FI, col. 5. Adelman 
also opined that although international law did not prevent the Israeli attack on Iraq, the 
United States was not in as precarious a strategic situation as Israel and thus "[could] 
afford to be more legal minded." Id. 
10 The only published discussion appears in Roberts, Would Law Allow U.S. Attack on 
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the United States has not yet attacked the plant, the possibility it 
may do so still exists. Moreover, history suggests that if the United 
States does attack the plant, it will attempt to justify its actions 
under international law. I I 
Whether or not a U.S. attack on the Libyan chemical weapons 
plant would be permissible under international law depends on 
the facts existing at the time of the attack. Thus, at this point in 
time, it is impossible to state with any degree of certainty what 
the proper conclusion would be. Notwithstanding this limitation, 
however, it is useful to discuss the relevant consider~tions that 
would be raised under international law and to establish a frame-
work that policy makers and lawyers may rely on in deciding 
whether to authorize such an attack and by which commentators 
could decide to approve or criticize such an attack. 
Part I of this article sets forth the international legal principles 
pertaining to the use of force and evaluates their adequacy in 
light of the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. Part II 
applies these principles to the 1981 Israeli attack on the Iraqi 
nuclear reactor at Osiraq, which has important implications in 
evaluating any future attack on the plant at Rabta. Part III focuses 
on the threat Colonel Qadhafi poses to U.S. national security and 
the response of the United States to that threat. Part IV evaluates 
the publicly disclosed information on the Rabta facility and the 
particular threat Libya's possession of chemical weapons would 
present to the United States. Part V discusses the U.S. response 
to the threat thus far, and applies relevant principles of interna-
tional law. Part VI considers the analyses imparted by the pre-
ceding sections to determine whether the United States may at-
tack the Rabta facility under international law. 
This comment concludes that although the Rabta facility poses 
a potential threat to the United States, at present the U.S. may 
not attack it under any theory of international law. Clearly, how-
ever, a foundation exists that, together with further develop-
ments, could support an attack under the modern theory of 
anticipatory self-defense. 
Plant in Libya, L.A. Daily J.. Jan. 5, 1989, at I, col. 6. That article quotes the opinion of 
various legal scholars but does not provide an extensive analysis of the issues. 
11 For example, the United States attempted to justify the 1986 attack on Tripoli as 
being valid under international law while opponents of the attack criticized it as being 
unlawful. See infra notes 104-114 and accompanying text. 
56 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIII, No.1 
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 
A. The Peaceful Settlement of Disputes 
One fundamental principle of modern international law obli-
gates states to try to resolve disputes peacefully before they resort 
to the use of force. Article 2(3) of the United Nations Charter 
(Charter) requires states to "settle their international disputes by 
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and 
security, and justice, are not endangered."12 Article 33 of the 
Charter requires states involved in international disputes to "seek 
a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbi-
tration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrange-
ments, or other peaceful means of their own choice."13 Article 
2(4) provides that all states must "refrain from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the United Nations."14 Thus, the Charter places an af-
firmative duty on states to try to resolve their disputes peacefully 
and restricts the customary right of states to resort to force. The 
Charter does not, however, prohibit the use of force by a state in 
self-defense. 
B. Self-Defense Under the u.N. Charter 
Article 51 of the Charter preserves "the inherent right of in-
dividual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs 
against a member [state] .... "15 That right of self-defense con-
tinues to exist, according to article 51, only "until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international 
peace and security."16 The Charter thus creates an international 
order in which states may act in self-defense until the Security 
Council provides for their requisite national security. 
Because members of the Security Council usually cannot agree 
on whether to send peacekeeping forces to a region experiencing 
armed conflict, the Security Council has become largely ineffec-
12 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3. 
13 [d. at art. 33, para. 1. 
14 [d. at art. 2, para. 4. 
15 [d. at art. 51. 
16 [d. The Charter makes clear that one goal of the United Nations is "to ensure, by 
acceptance of principles, and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be 
used save in the common interest." [d. at preamble. 
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tive. The possibility of an absolute veto over such an initiative by 
one or more of the five permanent members of the Security 
Council guarantees that no state can be certain that the Security 
Council will provide for its security. The result of this impasse is 
that states frequently resort to self-help and use force when their 
national security is significantly threatened by another stateY 
The increasing proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological 
weapons has exacerbated the problem over the last few years. 
Because such weapons are capable of sudden and mass destruc-
tion, states must not only wonder whether the Security Council 
will act on their behalf but whether such assistance, if offered at 
all, will arrive too late. In the absence of a genuine guarantee of 
collective security, states must consider whether they should 
preempt a likely attack of another state in order to preserve their 
own national security. International legal scholars commonly re-
fer to this type of preemptive attack as the use of anticipatory 
self-defense. 18 
The legal question that arises from the use of anticipatory self-
defense is whether it is lawful under the United Nations Charter. 
The early writings that addressed this question usually focused 
on the condition precedent of an "armed attack" required by 
article 51 to justify the use of force in self-defense. 19 This narrow 
interpretation of permissible self-defense may have been appro-
priate when only the superpowers possessed weapons of mass 
destruction: for against all others, nations usually would have 
adequate time to resort to the United Nations or to prepare their 
own defenses. In contemporary times, however, in which the 
peacekeeping function of the Security Council has been largely 
ineffective and weapons of mass destruction are possessed by 
many countries, scholarly writings have tended to interpret article 
51 more broadly in order to validate appropriate uses of antici-
patory self-defense.2o 
17 See infra notes 30-40 and accompanying text. 
18 See generally Shoemaker, Right of States to Use Armed Force, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1620 
(1984); Zedalis, Preliminary Thoughts on Some Unresolved Questions Involving the Law of 
Anticipatory Self-Defense, 19 CASE W. RES.]. INT'L L. 129 (1987); Note, National Self-Defense 
in International Law: An Emerging Standard for a Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 187 (1984). 
19 See, e.g., P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 165-66 (1948); Tucker, The Interpre-
tation of War Under Present International Law, 4 INT'L L.Q. 11,29 (1951). 
20 See generally McCredie, The April 14, 1986 Bombing of Libya: Act of Self-Defense or 
Reprisal?, 19 CASE W. RES.]. INT'L L. 215 (1987); Note, supra note 18, at 187. 
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This change in philosophy seems to have been first adopted by 
legal scholars writing about the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.21 Before 
that war began, Israel faced extremely provocative acts by sur-
rounding Arab states that would have led any reasonable Israeli 
government to conclude that an all-out invasion was imminent. 
The Israeli government did so conclude and responded by 
launching a massive preemptive strike. The United Nations rec-
ognized Israel's predicament and did not condemn its use of 
anticipatory self-defense.22 
The remarkable Israeli victory was due in part to its preemptive 
attack. The Israeli success demonstrated the significant advantage 
to future aggressors and defenders of attacking first, especially 
when mobile weapons such as airplanes and tanks are used. The 
evolution of warfare capability in the form of fast and accurate 
weaponry has made it clear to many international legal scholars 
that the Charter's condition precedent of an "armed attack" be-
fore acting in self-defense is no longer militarily pragmatic. 23 
Consequently, scholars have begun to reject the unduly restrictive 
requirement of an armed attack under article 51 and have instead 
started to return to the pre-Charter customary law formulation 
of anticipatory self-defense. That principle, embodied in the Car-
oline Doctrine, allows resort to force only if the necessity is "in-
stant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment for deliberation."24 But the customary international law 
formulation may be just as unacceptably restrictive as the "armed 
attack" requirement provided by article 51 of the Charter. In 
circumstances involving the possible use of weapons of mass de-
struction, a state simply may not be able to afford to wait until 
the necessity to act is so dire. 
A better approach that seems to be gaining acceptance among 
scholars allows the use of force in anticipatory self-defense when 
a state reasonably perceives a significant threat to its national 
security and responds to that threat in a reasonable manner. 
21 [d. at 192-93. 
22 [d. at 193. 
23 McCredie, supra note 20, at 215; Note, supra note 18, at 187. 
24 Letter from Secretary Webster to Mr. Fox (Apr. 24, 1981), reprinted in 29 BRITISH 
AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1129, 1138. The traditional principle of anticipatory self-
defense was first enunciated by Secretary of State Daniel Webster in his response to a 
Canadian attack on the American ship Caroline, which had been assisting Canadian rebels 
in their efforts against the Canadian government. See Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod 
Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (1938). 
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Determination of whether a perception of a threat is reasonable 
requires a subjective analysis of whether the state itself actually 
perceives the threat and an objective analysis of whether third 
party states would view the threat in the same manner. Deter-
mination of whether a response is reasonable requires an objec-
tive analysis of whether the force used to counter the threat is 
proportional to the threat and narrowly tailored to its elimina-
tion. 25 This approach, similar to one used by U.S. courts to de-
termine objectively whether acts of self-defense by criminal de-
fendants are justified,26 places a greater burden on the states to 
mean what they say and act as they intend. In an age when many 
nations hold weapons of mass destruction this emphasis is appro-
priate: for the interpretation of other nations' intentions may 
instantaneously mean the difference between peace and war. 
C. Reprisals Distinguished 
The right of anticipatory self-defense must be distinguished 
from the right of reprisal. The former is concerned with pre-
venting future attacks whereas the latter refers to punishment 
for past transgressions. Once permissible under customary inter-
national law, reprisals are now forbidden by the United Nations 
Charter.27 Despite criticisms of the unduly restrictive provisions 
of the Charter concerning acts of self-defense, commentators 
continue to believe that reprisals are still prohibited under inter-
nationallaw.28 
Similarly, a preemptive strike cannot be justified under a theory 
that the offending nation has engaged in a series of ongoing 
illegal acts, such as continual support of international terrorism. 
This "accumulation of events" theory has been rejected by the 
Security Council in other circumstances.29 This theory also seems 
contrary to the international order envisioned by the Charter's 
drafters. Nations may be able to undertake preemptive strikes to 
25 This is a variation of the view advocated by Myres S. McDougal and Florentino 
Feliciano in their book LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1961). For a discussion 
of the McDougal and Feliciano view, see Note, The Attack on Osirak: Delimitation of Self-
Defense Under International Law, 4 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 131 (1982). 
26 Note, supra note 18, at 208-17. 
27 For a discussion of the law of reprisals, see McCredie, supra note 20, at 236-40. 
28 Id.; see generally, Greenwood, International Law and the United States' Air Operation 
Against Libya, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 933 (1987). 
29 See Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. I, 4 (1972); 
Greenwood, supra note 28, at 954. 
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prevent future attacks, but they cannot do so in retaliation for one 
or more past attacks. Thus, the United States may not lawfully 
attack the facility at Rabta in retaliation for past Libyan acts of 
terrorism. Rather, a lawful attack on the Rabta facility must, at 
the very least, be undertaken with the intent to prevent future 
attacks. It also would be subject to the other constraints of the 
modern anticipatory self-defense analysis, particularly the re-
quirement of proportionality. 
Before analyzing the threat the Libyan chemical weapons plant 
poses to U.S. national security and whether destruction of the 
plant would be lawful under a modern anticipatory self-defense 
analysis, it is useful to consider first the 1981 Israeli attack on the 
nuclear reactor at Osiraq, Iraq. Certain startling similarities and 
contrasts appear that aid an evaluation of an attack on the facility 
at Rabta. 
II. ISRAEL'S ATTACK AT OSIRAQ 
On Sunday June 7, 1981, Israeli warplanes attacked and de-
stroyed an Iraqi nuclear reactor under construction at Osiraq, 
near Baghdad.3D At least one person was killed during the attack. 
Israel's Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, defended the attack 
on the grounds that his country lawfully acted in anticipatory 
self-defense. 31 Begin asserted that Iraq intended to use the nu-
clear reactor to produce atomic bombs that would ultimately be 
exploded in IsraeP2 He further argued that the attack could not 
have been postponed because the reactor would have been com-
pleted shortly and, once completed, could not safely be destroyed 
without the possibility of radioactive fallout reaching Baghdad.33 
Despite these contentions, the international community con-
demned the Israeli attack. When Iraq's Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, Saadoun Hammadi, requested that the matter be discussed 
30 See generally Rubin, That Israeli Raid on the Iraqi Reactor: The Facts-and Deeper Issues, 
Christian Sci. Monitor, June 24, 1981, at 12, col. 6; Russell, Attack-and Fallout: Israel Blasts 
Iraq's Reactor and Creates a Global Shock Wave, Time, June 22, 1981, at 24; Shipler, Israeli 
Jets Destroy Iraqi Atomic Reactor; Attack Condemned by U.S. and Arab Nations, N.Y. Times, 
June 9, 1981, at AI, col. 6. 
31 Begin declared: "We shall defend our people with all the means at our disposal. We 
shall not allow any enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction against us." Shipler, 
Begin Defends Raid, Pledges to Thwart a New "Holocaust," N.V. Times, June 10, 1981, at AI, 
col. 6. 
32 Shipler, supra note 30 at AI, col. 6. 
33 Id. 
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in the Security Council, the United Nations became the forum 
for debate. 34 The foreign minister called the attack a "barbarous 
act" and later added that the reactor was being constructed for 
peaceful purposes.35 He also argued that Iraq, in contrast to 
Israel, was a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
and did not violate its safeguard agreement with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency.36 Finally, Hammadi contendecl"that Israel 
possessed nuclear weapons, and that by destroying the reactor at 
Osiraq, Israel was attempting to maintain its military superiority 
in the Middle East. 37 
Israel replied to these accusations through its Ambassador to 
the United Nations, Yehuda Blum. He argued that the reactor 
would have been used to produce nuclear weapons and that the 
target of the weapons would have been Israel.38 He further noted 
that the attack was conducted on a Sunday when it was least likely 
that there would be a loss of life.39 In effect, he argued that the 
reactor posed a significant threat to Israel and that Israel re-
sponded reasonably to defend itself against that threat. Although 
the Security Council unanimously condemned Israel's actions,40 
it may have done so for political, rather than legal, reasons. To 
undertake a non political legal analysis, one must first evaluate 
the threat to Israel and then examine Israel's response to that 
threat. 
A. The Threat to Israel 
Application of the modern theory of anticipatory self-defense 
requires analysis to focus on the reasonableness of Israel's general 
apprehensions that Iraq intended to produce nuclear weapons at 
Osiraq and use such weapons against Israel. 41 There is indeed 
34 36 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Apr.-June 1981), U.N. Doc. SII4509 (1981) . 
• 35 Id. 
3(; Id. 
37 /d. Hammadi's contention undermines his argument that Iraq constructed the reactor 
for peaceful purposes, for he implies that Israel correctly perceived a challenge to its 
military superiority. 
3H U.N. SCOR Supp. (Apr.-June 1981), U.N. Doc. SII45 10 (1981). 
39Id. 
40 S.c. Res. 487, 36 U.N. SCOR (2288th mtg.) at 10, U.N. Doc. S/INF/37 (1981). 
41 Many of the writings on the use of force by American international legal scholars 
have focused on Israel. This is partly due to the numerous military engagements that 
Israel has been involved in since its independence in 1948 and partly because of its role 
as America's closest ally in the region. In addition, Israel has sought international accep-
tance of its military actions and has consistently tried to justify its actions under interna-
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evidence to justify both beliefs. Iraq possessed 200,000 pounds 
of yellowcake natural uranium that has little use except for con-
version into plutonium.42 In fact, Iraq refused to accede to the 
French suggestion that it replace the high-enriched uranium with 
a low-enriched fuel known as caramel. Caramel would have been 
suitable to operate the reactor but could not have been used to 
produce weapons-grade plutonium.43 Further, the type of reactor 
built at Osiraq was fully capable of transforming yellowcake ura-
nium into weapons-grade plutonium in sufficient quantities for 
production of nuclear bombs,44 and Iraq clearly had the requisite 
technical knowledge and skill to take the weapons-grade pluton-
ium and construct nuclear weapons.45 Illustratively, the reactor 
at Osiraq was much larger than Iraq needed for research pur-
poses and much larger than the oil rich country needed for 
energy production.46 These factors led some U.S. Senators to 
conclude that Iraq was developing a nuclear weapons program.47 
In this light, a similar conclusion by Israeli policymakers seems 
reasonable.48 The more immediate question facing Israeli officials 
was whether Iraq would use such weapons against Israel. 
tional law. Such efforts, however, seem to have made it more amenable to criticism from 
governments and scholars. 
42 The Israeli Air Strike: Hearings Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 
97th Congo 1st Sess. 125-26 [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (comments by Dr. Herbert Kouts, 
Chairman, Department of Nuclear Energy, Brookhaven National Laboratory and Roger 
Richter, former International Atomic Energy Agency Inspector). 
43 See id. at 139 (statement by Senator Rudy Boschwitz); id. at 191 (testimony by 
Representative Jonathan Bingham). 
44 Id. at 124 (testimony of Dr. Robert Selden, Division Leader, Applied Theoretical 
Physics Division, Los Alamos National Laboratory, stating, "There is no question that 
plutonium can be produced in this reactor .... For the purpose of producing plutonium 
there are many reactors which are far better than this reactor."); id. at 173 (statement of 
Dr. Carnesale, John F. Kennedy School of Government and Public Policy, stating that 
OSIRAK is not the best reactor for producing plutonium but it may have been the best 
available to Iraq for that purpose). 
45 See id. at 124. 
46 See id. at 126 (Dr. Kouts commenting, "I believe it is probably well beyond anything 
they need for the level of technology they have."). 
47 See id. at 15 (statement of Senator Paul Sarbanes); id. at 19 (statement of Senator 
Paul Tsongas); id. at 21 (statement of Senator Alan Cranston). 
48 The Senate Hearings also revealed that Israel must have had little regard for the 
fact that Iraq was a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its reactors 
thereby subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and controls. 
One problem with the IAEA inspections was that since 1976 they were always performed 
by Soviet and Hungarian citizens. Also, Iraq could withdraw from the Treaty with three 
months' notice, thereby ending all IAEA inspection. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, 1 July 1968, art. X, 21 V.S.T. 438, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 727 V.N.T.S. 
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Israel's perception that Iraq would use such weapons against 
Israel seems reasonable in light of Iraqi statements of intent and 
the historically hostile relations between the two states. Iraq has 
been extremely hostile towards Israel since the founding of the 
latter in 1948 and has called consistently for the elimination of 
the "Zionist entity"49 even though the two countries share no 
common border. In a 1980 interview with a Lebanese weekly, 
Iraqi Foreign Minister Hammadi stated: 
Iraq cannot agree to the existence of Zionism-neither as a 
movement nor as a state .... The Arab nation cannot agree 
to the amputation of any part from its body ... because the 
land of Palestine is an Arab land and we cannot conceive 
giving it up .... The struggle against Zionism is for us a 
struggle in which there can be no compromise.50 
Similarly, in August 1980, while discussing a proposed boycott of 
any nation that maintained an embassy in Jerusalem, Iraqi Pres-
ident Sad dam Hussein declared: "Some people ask if this [boy-
cott] decision is the best that can be taken. No, a better decision 
would be to destroy Tel Aviv with bombs. But we have to use the 
weapons available until it is actually possible to respond to the 
enemy with bombs."51 
Iraqi antagonism towards Israel is more than just rhetoric. 
Israel believes that Iraq is a major sponsor of terrorist activities 
that, until recently, were conducted by the Palestine Liberation 
Organization. Iraq also led the Arab rejectionist front in denounc-
ing the Camp David Accords.52 Iraq never signed the armistice 
161. Senator John Glenn remarked that the Israeli attack was "the first gigantic vote of 
no confidence in the international nonproliferation regime, including the IAEA safe-
guards." Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 12. 
49 Iraq has never used the name "Israel" when referring to the Jewish State; rather, it 
has referred to Israel as the "Zionist entity." 
50 Shoham, The Israeli Aerial Raid Upon the Imqi Nuclear React01' and the Right of Self-
Defense, 109 MIL. L. REV. 191,205 (1985), quoting AI Jumhur AI-Judid, Jan. 31, 1980. 
51 This statement was by Baghdad's "Voice of the Masses" and later recorded by FBIS 
on August 21, 1980. In response to the statement, the Iraqi Information Ministry an-
nounced that: 
We ask Khomeini and his gang: who is going to benefit from destroying the 
Iraqi nuclear reactor-is it Iran or the Zionist entity? This reactor does not 
constitute danger to Iran because Iraq looks at Iranian people with a brotherly 
look .... The one who fears the Iraqi nuclear reactor is the Zionist entity. 
Shoham, supm note 50, at 208, quoting AI-Jumhuriya, Oct. 4, 1980, at I (emphasis added). 
52 Iraq convened an Arab summit at the conclusion of the Camp David Summit and 
led the movement to condemn the Accords. See D. BERINDRANTH, IRAQ: THE LAND OF 
ARAB RESURGENCE 93 (1979). The Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council stated that "all 
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Agreements of 1949 and thus is still technically at war with Is-
rael. 53 Although these facts alone do not legally justify the Israeli 
attack, they do support Israeli apprehension about Iraq's inten-
tions. As Professor lohn N orton Moore testified before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee: "These unlawful actions [by Iraq] 
contributed significantly to the Israeli concerns about Iraqi acqui-
sition of nuclear weapons. As such, however we characterize the 
Israeli air attack against Osiraq, it would seem that Iraq shares sub-
stantial responsibility for the overall climate that produced it."54 
B. Further Thoughts on the Israeli Perception of a Threat 
Israel's particular national security requirements help place 
Israel's perception of the Iraqi threat in perspective. Israel is a 
tiny nation bordered on the north and east by hostile nations. 
Other states provide billions of dollars to support terrorist attacks 
against Israel. Even some states that are not hostile to Israel are 
afraid to speak out on its behalf because of the powerful oil 
weapon wielded by Arab nations. Still others probably feel that 
Israel's remarkable military successes over its larger and better 
equipped adversaries means that its national security is no longer 
threatened. Finally, Israel's support from the United States also 
contributes to a sense that the threats it faces are no longer so 
dire. 
The size of the country, however, and the fact that the vast 
majority of its population lives in just three cities, makes it par-
ticularly vulnerable to weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, 
Iraq's H;cent use of chemical weapons against Iran and against 
its own Kurdish minority indicates that it seems to have little or 
no reservation about using weapons of mass destruction that the 
international community abhors. Although these chemical weap-
ons attacks occurred after the Israeli attack in 1981, the Iraqi 
leadership was essentially the same, and there cannot be any sure 
convictions that Iraq would not use nuclear weapons if it pos-
sessed them. Indeed, in view of the fact that Iraq started the war 
attempts for reconciliation with the Zionist entity should be discarded" and proposed that 
Iraq and Syria consolidate military troops to confront Israel. [d. at 94-95. 
53 See General Armistice Agreement, Feb. 24, 1949, Israel and Egypt, 42 U.N .T.S. 251; 
General Armistice Agreement, Mar. 23, 1949, Israel and Lebanon, 42 U.N.T.S. 287; 
General Armistice Agreement, Apr. 3, 1949, Jordan and Israel, 42 U.N.T.S. 303. 
54 Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 247-48 (statement of John Norton Moore, Professor 
of Law and Director, Center for Law and National Security, University of Virginia). 
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with Iran and then used its chemical weapons once Iran appeared 
to be winning, the chief beneficiary of the Israeli attack may have 
been Iran and not Israel. In any event, Israel seems to have been 
acting under a reasonably perceived threat to its national security. 
In this light, it is clear that Israel could reasonably perceive 
that it could not wait any longer. Iraq must have known that 
building the peculiar reactor would be perceived by Israel as a 
significant threat to its national security. Despite this probability, 
Iraq continued to build it content with the knowledge that it had 
no common border with Israel and that it had the superpower 
patronage of the Soviet Union. Neither of these defenses, how-
ever, prevented the Israelis from acting. 
C. Israel's Reaction to the Threat 
As discussed, international law requires an aggrieved nation to 
seek a diplomatic resolution to any conflict before resorting to 
force. Because Israel allegedly did not seek such a diplomatic 
solution, the United States joined other nations in condemning 
the attack.55 Commentators suggested that Israel could have tried 
to negotiate directly with Iraq56 or could have attempted to es-
tablish the Middle East as a nuclear nonproliferation zoneY Com-
mentators also suggested that Israel could have further com-
plained to the Security Council, "which would not be expected to 
react with indifference to a nuclear menace."58 
Hyperbole aside, the fact of the matter is that in view of Iraq's 
intractable hatred of and hostility towards Israel, direct negotia-
tions between the two countries would have been impossible. 
Similarly, negotiations through a third-party also would not have 
been realistically feasible. With respect to the second suggestion, 
Israel could have replied that it had been trying to persuade the 
United Nations to establish the Middle East as a nuclear nonpro-
liferation zone since 1975. Israel unsuccessfully renewed that 
effort one year before the raid.59 The last suggestion, that Israel 
55 U.N. Doc. S/PV. 2288 at 58-60 (1981). 
56 Rubin, supra note 30, at 12, col. 6. 
57 Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 229 (statement of Professor Mallison, George 
Washington University School of Law). 
58 Mallison & Mallison, The Israeli Aerial Attack of June 7, 1981, Upon the Iraqi Nuclear 
Reactor: Aggression or Self-Defense?, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 417, 428 (1982). 
59 30 U.N. GAOR C.l. (31st mtg.) at 20-26, U.N. Doc. AIC 1I35/PV. 31 (1980) (statement 
of Mr. Eilan, Israeli Representative to the U.N. First Committee). In 1980, Israel submitted 
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could have sought assistance from the Security Council, is equally 
implausible. Paralyzed by the veto wielded by Iraq's Soviet ally, 
the Security Council probably would not have acted and certainly 
would not have done so before the reactor was completed.60 
Israel faced criticism in the United States for not waiting until 
the reactor was completed and the threat became more urgent. 
Israel's response-that a delay in the attack on the reactor until 
after it was operational could result in the release of radioactive 
fallout endangering Baghdad-was scoffed at by scientists of the 
Congressional Research Service.61 Since the Congressional hear-
ings, however, the disaster at Chernobyl seems to lend support 
to Israeli concerns. Indeed the explosive destruction of an op-
erating nuclear facility employing high-enriched uranium that 
Iraq insisted on using, could have caused even more significant 
damage than the tragedy at Chernobyl. 
In light of the threat perceived by Israel and indeed posed by 
Iraq, Israel could not reasonably be expected to postpone the 
exercise of its right of self-defense until after Iraq's reactor be-
came operational, let alone until after Iraq possessed nuclear 
weapons. The only adequate defense left to Israel was the im-
mediate destruction of the reactor. Israel limited the attack to the 
facility under construction that could be used for producing nu-
clear weapons and did not extend its strike to other targets. 
Furthermore, Israel purposely conducted the attack on a Sunday, 
when most of the workers at the site were absent, and did so with 
almost surgical precision.62 Thus, it seems clear that Israel re-
sponded proportionally to a reasonably perceived threat and thus 
conducted a lawful attack against Iraq. 
a draft resolution on this issue to the U.N. General Assembly. See U.N. Doc. AlC 1135/8 
(1980). There were no results from this initiative. 
60 See Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 253 (Professor John N. Moore testifying, "I am 
rather sympathetic with the Israeli feeling that if Iraq were suddenly one day to announce 
to the world that it had three nuclear weapons or a number of nuclear weapons, it is 
unlikely there would be any international sanctions taken."). 
61 The Congressional Research Study conducted a study and concluded that "it would 
be most unlikely for an attack with conventional bombs upon the reactor when operating 
to have caused lethal exposures to radioactivity in Baghdad .... " Congressional Research 
Service, Possible Contamination of Baghdad from Bombing of Iraqi Reactor, June 18, 1981, 
reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 154, 156. 
62 The fact that only one person was killed, although lamentable, is directly attributable 
to the amazing proficiency of the Israeli Air Force. 
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Before 1969, Libya was not active in international affairs. The 
discovery of oil and Colonel Qadhafi's subsequent military coup, 
however, dramatically changed Libya's position internationally. 
Colonel Qadhafi used the country's oil revenues to develop Lib-
ya's economy, build an army, and support terrorist groups around 
the world. 63 Colonel Qadhafi is perhaps best known, however, for 
his support of Arab terrorist groups such as the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, the Fatah, and 
the Abu Nidal organization.64 Indeed, in 1984, the Abu Nidal 
organization, which has been linked to numerous terrorist attacks 
against Americans, moved its headquarters to Libya.65 
The focus of much of Colonel Qadhafi's rhetoric and terrorist 
activity has been the United States. On several occasions, the 
Colonel has stated that the United States is the primary obstacle 
to achieving peace in the Middle East. In 1984, he announced to 
his fellow Libyans that "we are capable of exporting terrorism to 
the heart of America."6ti He later added: "We have the right to 
fight America, and we have the right to export terrorism to 
them."67 
Indeed, terrorist acts by Arabs have been committed against 
Americans with Qadhafi's support. On December 27, 1985, ter-
rorists attacked airline offices in Rome and Vienna killing twenty 
6:l Qadhafi has supported groups from the Irish Republican Army to the Moro National 
Liberation Front in the Philippines. See generally Libya Under QadhaJi: A Pattern of Aggression, 
U.S. Dep't of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Spec. Rep. No. 138, Jan. 1986. 
64 ld. at 2. Colonel Qadhafi recently acknowledged Libya's historical support of terrorist 
activities in an interview with Al Mwawar, an Egyptian news magazine. The Colonel also 
claimed to have withdrawn Libya's sponsorship from the groups conducting terrorist 
activities because, "[W]e found out that they were practicing terrorism for the sake of 
terrorism and for other objectives that had nothing to do with our national cause." QadhaJi 
Says He Sponsored and Now Fonakes Terrorists, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1989, at A8, col. I. 
Although this statement is certainly a positive development, Colonel Qadhafi implies that 
Libya would readily support terrorism that furthers its "national cause." 
6'ld. 
661d. 
67 ld. Colonel Qadhafi has recently suggested that the United States and Libya can solve 
many of their problems through negotiation. QadhaJi Says He Sponsored and Now Forsakes 
Terrorists, supra note 64, at A8, col. I. 
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civilians, including five Americans, and injuring over eighty oth-
ers.68 The terrorists used passports supplied by Libya.69 
American relations with Libya quickly deteriorated after the 
Rome and Vienna attacks. President Reagan explicitly accused 
Libya of assisting the Abu Nidal organization which had com-
mitted the attacks. Qadhafi denied that his country had assisted 
the terrorists, but he called their acts "heroic."70 President Reagan 
responded by sending a United States carrier task force into the 
Mediterranean Sea,7l and forbidding Americans from traveling 
to or conducting business in Libya without a license.72 In addition, 
the President severed all economic ties between the two 
countries73 and sought support for these sanctions from other 
nations. Finally, the President announced that economic sanctions 
against Libya would not be terminated unless Qadhafi ended 
Libya'S support of terrorist groupS.74 
Tensions between the United States and Libya escalated in 
response to U.S. economic sanctions and Qadhafi's subsequent 
reaction. In January 1986, United States warships engaged in 
exercises in the Gulf of Sidra which most nations, including the 
United States, regard as international waters.75 Qadhafi, in con-
trast, claims those waters are part of Libya'S territorial seas and, 
in response to the United States naval exercise, placed Libya'S 
armed forces on "full alert."76 Despite a high tension level during 
those naval exercises, no military engagements between the two 
nations occurred. 
The United States conducted further exercises in the Gulf of 
Sidra in March 1986.77 This time, Libyan forces fired six missiles 
68 Boyd, U.S. Accuses Libya of Aiding Gunmen in Airport Raids, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1985, 
at AI, col. 6. 
69 Libya Under Qadhafi, supra note 63, at 2. 
70 Trewhitt, A New War-And Risks, U.S. News & World Rep., Apr. 28, 1986, at 20,23. 
71 Gwertzman, U.S. Sends Libya Mixed Signals on Possibility of Military Action, N.Y. Times, 
Jan. 4, 1986, at AI, col. 4. 
72 Libyan Sanctions Regulations, 51 Fed. Reg. 1354 (1986) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. 
§ 101.807). 
73 [d. The regulations prohibited imports, exports, transportation, or travel to or from 
Libya; performance of contracts supporting projects in Libya; and extension of any credit 
or loans to the Libyan Government. 
74 Reagan Lists Terms for Lifting Libyan Sanctions, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1986, at 12, col. 
3. 
75 See Gwertzman, U.S. Navy Exercise Starts Off Libya, N.V. Times, Jan. 25, 1986, at AI, 
col. 3. 
76 [d. 
77 The announced purposes of these operations were "to gather intelligence, to assert 
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at V.S. planes flying more than twelve miles from the Libyan 
coastline but within the area in dispute. ill The V.S. Navy re-
sponded by attacking Libyan patrol boats and missile sites. i!l De-
spite these American counterattacks, Qadhafi declared the inci-
dent a Libyan "triumph."llo 
Tensions increased once again when, on April 5, 1986, a bomb 
exploded in a West German discotheque frequented by American 
servicemen.8) Two Americans, including one serviceman, were 
killed in the attack. One hundred and fifty-four persons were 
wounded, including fifty to sixty Americans. V.S. government 
officials announced that they believed that the bombing was part 
of a "pattern of indiscriminate violence" by Libya against Amer-
icans. They further alleged that Colonel Qadhafi was planning 
to attack some thirty V.S. installations abroad and had targeted 
American diplomats as potential victims ofterrorist attacks.1l2 V.S. 
policy makers apparently concluded that a strong show of force 
was needed to persuade Qadhafi to cancel those attacks. That 
conclusion led to the decision to attack Tripoli. 
B. The American Attack on Tripoli 
In the early morning hours of April 15, 1986, American air-
craft attacked the Libyan capital of Tripoli.83 The attack was 
conducted by Air Force F-lll aircraft based in Great Britain and 
by Navy aircraft launched from carriers of the Sixth Fleet. It 
lasted less than a half hour. Specific targets included the Tripoli 
and Benina military air fields, Benghazi and Azziziyah military 
barracks, and the Sidi Balal training camp.84 Libyan forces 
downed one of the attacking aircraft, killing both crewmen. 
The White House explained the raid in the following manner: 
the right of innocent passage, and the right to sail in international waters." Halloran, 2 
U.S. Ships Enter Soviet Waters Off Crimea to Gather Intelligence, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1986, 
at AI, col. 5. 
78 Weintraub, U.S. Citing Libyan Fire, Reports Attacking a Missile Site and Setting 2 Ships 
Ablaze, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1986, at AI, col. 6. 
7°ld.; Weintraub, 2 More Libyan Vessels Sunk and Base Hit Again, U.S. Says, Vowing to Keep 
Up Patrols, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1986, at AI, col. 6. 
80 Kifner, Qadhafi Claiming Victory by Libya, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1986, at A3, col. I. 
8, Boyd, U.S. Sees Methods of Libya in Attack, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1986, at AI, col. 5. 
821d. 
83 Gordon, Pentagon Details 2-Pronged Attack, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1986, at AI, col. 5. 
MId. 
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U.S. forces struck targets that were part of Qadhafi's ter-
rorist infrastructure-the command and control systems, in-
telligence, communications, logistics, and training facilities. 
These are sites which allow Qadhafi to perpetrate terrorist 
acts. 
In addition to the strikes at terrorist centers, the President 
also authorized limited defense suppression missions in order 
to defend our own forces engaged in this mission. Every 
effort was made to avoid civilian casualties and limit collateral 
damage and to avoid casualties to those American servicemen 
who are participating.85 
The declared purpose of the attack, therefore, was to hinder 
Libya's ability to sponsor or conduct future terrorist attacks by 
destroying part of its terrorist infrastructure. 
Qadhafi survived the attack, but reports asserted that his step-
daughter was killed and two of his sons were wounded.86 Ac-
cording to Libyan official Abdul Salam Talloud, thirty-seven peo-
ple were killed and another ninety-three were injured, many of 
them civilians.87 According to U.S. military officials, when viewed 
in its entirety, the mission was successful, and the strike force was 
praised for its extraordinary performance.88 
C. International Reaction to the Attack 
Colonel Qadhafi castigated the United States for conducting 
the attack and criticized Great Britain for allowing American 
planes stationed on its soil to be used in the attack.89 In addition, 
Libyan forces retaliated by firing two missiles at a U.S. Coast 
Guard communications installation in the Mediterranean but 
caused no damage.9o Finally, during the two weeks that followed 
the raid, terrorist groups with ties to Libya committed acts of 
terrorism against American businesses in France and British busi-
85 U.S. Exercises Right of Self-Defense Against Libyan Terrorism, White House Statement 
(Apr. 14, 1986), reprinted in 86 Dep't of State Bull., No. 2111, at 1 (june 1986). 
86 Doctor Describes 'Terror' Among Qadhafi Family, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1986, at A17, col. 
1. 
87 Schumacher, Tripoli Buries Its Dead With Tears and Threats, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1986, 
at 5, col. 1. 
88 Manning, The Raid: Was It Worth It?, U.S. News & World Rep., May 5, 1986, at 18, 
col. 3. 
89 Schumacher, Qadhafi, on TV, Condemns Attack, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1986, at AI, col. 
5. 
90 Weintraub, U.S. Calls Libya Raid a Success, N.V. Times, Apr. 16, 1986, at AI, col. 6. 
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nesses in Lebanon.91 Terrorist threats were made against other 
American facilities throughout the world.92 
In the United States, the American public overwhelmingly ap-
proved of the attack. One media poll showed that 77 percent of 
Americans supported the bombing of Libya even though 43 per-
cent predicted that there would be increased tension.93 Many 
Americans cancelled summer travel plans to Europe because of 
a fear that terrorists would retaliate.94 
Reactions on Capitol Hill were also extremely favorable.95 Even 
liberal leaders of the Democratic Party supported the President.96 
Legislation was introduced that would have authorized the Pres-
ident to respond to future acts of terrorism without consulting 
Congress in advance.97 The strike also seemed to help persuade 
the Senate to consent to an amendment to the extradition treaty 
with the United Kingdom that would include terrorism as an 
extraditable offense.98 
The supportive reactions of the American public and Congress 
were not forthcoming from most of America's allies in Western 
Europe. Greece claimed that the air strike would "set dynamite 
to peace," and Italy asserted that the attack would result in "pro-
voking explosive reactions of fanaticism .... "99 France charac-
terized the attack as a "reprisal ... that itself revives the chain of 
violence," and Belgium expressed "regret [about the] ... Amer-
ican ... recourse to a military action."lOo West Germany asserted 
that "a violent solution will not be successful and is not very 
promising."101 
91 McFadden, Bomb Blasts in France and Lebanon Rock American and British Offices, N.Y. 
Times, Apr. 27, 1986, at 14, col. 5. 
92 Libya Raid Ignites Anti-U.S. Protests, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1986, at A8, col. 6. 
93 Clymer, A Poll Finds 77% in U.S. Approve Raid on Libya, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1986, 
at A23, col. 1. 
94 Treaster, Tour Bookings to Caribbean Rise Along With Americans 'Fear of Europe', N.Y. 
Times, Apr. 20, 1986, at 14, col. 1. 
95 Roberts, From Capitol Hill, Words of Support Are Mixed With Some Reservations, N.Y. 
Times, Apr. 15, 1986, at A 10, col. 1. 
96See, e.g., The Libyan Equation, Nat'l Rev., May 23, 1986, at 13. 
97 Greenhouse, Bill Would Give Reagan a Free Hand on Terror, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1986, 
at A9, col. 5. 
98 Greenhouse, The War on Terrorism, From Tripoli to Belfast, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1986, 
at B6, col. 3. 
99 See Manning, In Western Europe, strains among friends, U.S. News & World Rep., Apr. 
28, 1986, at 24, col. 1. 
100ld. 
IOl/d. 
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Similarly, the United States was severely criticized in United 
Nations' debate. In the Security Council, the United States, Great 
Britain, and France vetoed a proposed resolution that "con-
demn[ ed] the armed attack by the United States of America in 
violation of the Charter of the United Nations."102 The General 
Assembly actually passed a resolution condemning the American 
attack by a vote of seventy-nine to twenty-eight, with thirty-three 
abstentions. lOS 
D. The Attack on Tripoli and International Law 
Shortly after the strike, President Reagan asserted that the 
United States attacked Libyan "terrorist centers" and military 
bases in response to the "reign of terror" Qadhafi's government 
had waged against the United States. 104 The President explained 
that the United States had proof of Libyan involvement in the 
bombing of the West German discotheque. Relying on evidence 
that he characterized as direct, precise, and irrefutable, the Pres-
ident described the proof of Libya's involvement in the disco-
theque bombing in the following statement: 
On March 25, more than a week before the [West German 
discotheque] attack, orders were sent from Tripoli to the 
[Libyan] People's Bureau in East Berlin to conduct a terrorist 
attack against Americans, to cause maximum and indiscrim-
inate casualties. Libya'S agents then planted the bomb. On 
April 4, the People's Bureau alerted Tripoli that the attack 
would be carried out the following morning. The next day 
they reported back to Tripoli on the great success of their 
mission. 105 
The United States, according to President Reagan, also had 
"solid evidence about other attacks Colonel Qadhafi planned 
against United States' installations and diplomats and even Amer-
ican tourists."106 The President explained that he ordered the air 
10. Weintraub, U.S. Says Allies Asked for More in Libya Attack, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22,1986, 
at AI, col. 5. 
lOS G.A. Res. 41/38, _U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. _) (1986). 
10<1 Weintraub, U.S. Jets Hit 'Terrorist Centers' in Libya, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1986, at AI, 
col. 6. 
105 Reagan, International Terrorism, U.S. Dep't of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Spec. 
Rep. No. 24, Feb. 28, 1986, at 1. 
106Id. United States officials later disclosed that they had proof that Libya had planned 
an attack on an American visa office in Paris. U.S. Aides Provide Details on Paris Plot Tied 
to Libya, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1986, at A18, col. 1. 
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strike in order to "alter [Qadhafi's] criminal behavior" and thus 
to preempt those attacks.107 
Having established a basis for asserting the proper exercise of 
anticipatory self-defense, the President somewhat obfuscated the 
purpose of the attack by declaring that, "[ w ]hen our citizens are 
abused or attacked anywhere in the world, on the direct orders 
of a hostile regime, we will respond .... Self-defense is not only 
our right, it is our duty."108 Although he used the magic words 
of "self-defense," the President also seemed to be implying that 
the strike was a reprisal for past Libyan terrorist attacks. He later 
reinforced that implication by stating: 
I warned that there should be no place on earth where ter-
rorists can rest and train and practice their skills. I meant it. 
I said that we would act with others if possible and alone if 
necessary to insure that terrorists have no sanctuary any-
where. 109 
The President's rationale for the attack thus appears somewhat 
ambiguous. He seems to claim that the strike was conducted not 
only to preempt future terrorist acts but also to punish Libya for 
its support of past terrorist acts. As discussed, the former may be 
a lawful pursuit under the modern theory of anticipatory self-
defense, whereas the latter is prohibited under international 
law. 110 
Despite ambiguities in the President's statement, the official 
justification for the air strike became more apparent when the 
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Vernon A. Walters, 
reported to the United Nations that the United States attacked 
Libya because of "compelling evidence of Libyan involvement in 
other planned attacks against the United States in recent weeks, 
several of which were designed to cause maximum casualties 
similar to the Berlin bombing."111 Ambassador Walters, while 
referring to Libyan support of the bombing of the West German 
discotheque, added that: 
In light of this reprehensible act of violence-only the latest 
in an ongoing pattern of attacks by Libya-and clear evidence 
107 Reagan, supra note 105, at 2. 
1081d. 
I09Id. 
110 See supra notes 15-26 and accompanying text. 
III Security Council Considers U.S. Self-Defense Exercises, Letter of Ambossador Walters to the 
United Nations (Apr. IS, 1986), reprinted in 86 Dep't of State Bull., No. 2111, at 19 (June 
1986). 
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that Libya is planning a multitude of future attacks, the 
United States was compelled to exercise its rights of self-
defense. 112 
The general consensus among commentators is that if the 
United States conducted the attack to prevent future Libyan use 
of its terrorist infrastructure, and not merely to punish Libya for 
supporting past terrorist attacks, the air strike was lawful under 
international law. 113 The commentators also recognize that be-
cause the United States must protect its intelligence sources and 
methods, 114 a complete disclosure of all the information in the 
hands of the President at the time he ordered the attack may 
never occur. Yet, it is difficult for some scholars to accept blindly 
a naked assertion of facts, even by the President. As the next 
section shows, these problems exist, perhaps even to a greater 
degree, in discussing the facts surrounding the Libyan facility at 
Rabta. 
IV. THE PLANT AT RABTA 
The lawfulness of any future attack on the plant at Rabta 
requires consideration of several factors. It is first necessary to 
determine from publicly disclosed information whether the facil-
ity is in fact a chemical weapons plant. Assuming, arguendo, that 
it is a chemical weapons plant, the next consideration is the type 
of threat such a plant poses to the international community, in 
general, and the United States, in particular. This entails the 
difficult task of trying to determine Colonel Qadhafi's intentions 
about the use of the plant from previous and present statements 
and behavior. Finally, it is necessary to examine the various U.S. 
responses to that threat to date and examine whether a military 
attack on the plant would be justified under international law. 
A. Is the Facility at Rabta a Chemical Weapons Plant? 
There is strong evidence that the facility at Rabta is designed 
to produce chemical weapons. Information about the plant first 
became public in the fall of 1988. Newspaper stories disclosed 
that President Reagan would "not rule out a preemptive attack 
1I21d. 
113 See, e.g., Greenwood, supra note 28, at 959; Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An 
International Legal Analysis, 19 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 177, 201-11 (1987). 
114 See generally Greenwood, supra note 28, at 933; Intoccia, supra note 113, at 177. 
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on an alleged chemical weapons factory, which U.S. officials say 
is at Rabta, 35 miles from the Mediterranean coast." 115 Such a 
potential strike was severely criticized by the Organization of 
African Unity and the Arab League as constituting "a new aggres-
sion against Libya under the pretext that Libya has a chemical 
weapons plant."116 Implicit in their criticism, therefore, was an 
assertion that the facility is not, in fact, a chemical weapons plant. 
Over the next several weeks, a vigorous international debate 
developed about whether the facility at Rabta was designed to 
produce chemical weapons or, rather, fertilizer or pharmaceuti-
cals. Director of Central Intelligence William H. Webster claimed 
that "the complex is the largest chemical weapon facility the [CIA] 
has detected under construction anywhere in the Third 
World."117 Qadhafi responded by asserting that the facility is a 
pharmaceutical factory; and, in order to prove it, he offered to 
allow a one-time international inspection of the plant. IIB The 
United States rejected that offer on the grounds that "evidence 
of chemical weapons production could be erased on short notice 
before the inspection took place."119 In addition, according to the 
State Department, "the installation could be modified before the 
inspection to resemble a civilian plant, like a pharmaceutical fac-
tory, and could revert to weapons production afterward."120 In 
effect, according to the Americans, Qadhafi had built a "flexible 
manufacturing plant ... [that] can make anything from antibiotics 
to pesticides to poison gas."121 
In the meantime, the American press began focusing on the 
role of West German companies in helping to build the Rabta 
facility. In a front page story on New Year's Day, 1989, the New 
York Times reported that the "United States has concluded that 
a West German company played a central role in the design and 
construction of a vast chemical plant in Libya, a discovery that 
has prompted diplomatic protests to the highest levels of the 
Bonn Government .... "122 U.S. officials added that "President 
115 Libya Offers to Accept Controls on Suspect Plant, Wash. Post, Dec. 25, 1988, at A48, col. 
5. 
116 Editorial, supra note I, at A14, col. J. 
117 Cannon & Ottaway, supra note I, at AI, col. J. 




122 Engleberg and Gordon, supra note I, at A I, col. J. 
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Reagan and Secretary of State George P. Shultz had strongly 
raised the issue of West German participation in the Libyan plant 
during a recent meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl in Wash-
ington on November 16."123 The West German company referred 
to by the American officials was Imhausen-Chemie whose presi-
dent, Dr. Jurgen Hippenstiel-Imhausen, vehemently denied any 
involvement of his company with the Rabta facility.124 
His denial was later supported by the West German govern-
ment on January 2, 1989, when it announced that "preliminary 
investigations had uncovered no proof that [the company] had 
helped build [the Rabta facility]."125 A newspaper story also noted 
that only Britain had agreed with the American claim that the 
plant was a chemical weapons facility while France and Italy were 
skeptical about U.S. claims. 126 The evidence, according to the 
press, consisted of "American reconnaissance photos and other 
evidence .... "127 The United States apparently was reluctant to 
provide additional evidence in order "to protect the intelligence 
sources that had provided the information."128 
Shortly thereafter, Secretary of State Shultz answered questions 
about the Libyan plant. In response to a question about his 
impressions of the plant, he stated: "Well, first of all, they do 
have a plant and it's designed to produce chemical weapons."129 
West German officials, however, disagreed with Shultz. After 
conducting their investigation, the West Germans found no evi-
dence to implicate Imhausen-Chemie in the Rabta plant's con-
struction. 130 Because of these findings, the West German media 
became very critical of their American counterparts for unfairly 
accusing the German company.131 
123 [d. 
124 [d. He stated that the "company had absolutely nothing to do with the allegations 
now concerning the plant presumed to be making chemical weapons in Libya. We don't 
even have the know-how in this area. We have no employees there, no technicians there 
either. We haven't had people there for years." [d. 
125 Markham, supra note 1, at A6, col. 1. 
126 [d. 
127 [d. 
128 Engleberg & Gordon, supra note I, at AI, col. 1. 
129 Schultz's Views on Chemical Arms, Libya, supra note 7, at A31, col. 6. 
130 Schmemann, Bonn Finds No Libya Tie at Company, N.V. Times, Jan. 5, 1989, at A14, 
col. 4. 
131 One paper stated, "The thought is simply unbearable that, of all people, a German 
company should be responsible for supplying the unpredictable dictator and terrorists' 
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The West German government also aggressively urged that the 
United States produce any additional evidence that would incrim-
inate Imhausen-Chemie. 132 According to newspaper stories, the 
West German government would not accept the American accu-
sation unless the United States government produced enough 
evidence that could persuade a court of law as to the company's 
guilt. American officials, in contrast, were concerned about the 
company's actual culpability and not about whether a criminal 
conviction could be obtained. 133 The State Department, however, 
ultimately acceded to the West German demand and reportedly 
agreed to supply them with the additional evidence. 
Before they received the new evidence, however, the West 
German officials began to change their public position on the 
matter. 134 They now claimed that it was not "very clear" as to 
what would be the true function of the plant. One official stated 
that "[i]f you're on the outside, it looks like one thing, and if you 
can get on the inside, it looks like something else."135 Another 
West German official acknowledged for the first time that inves-
tigators had discovered "indications" that Imhausen-Chemie and 
another West German company, IBI Engineering, may have 
helped build a chemical weapons plant at Rabta. 136 This change 
in the West German government's position was probably due to 
leaks to the German media about an internal Bonn investigation 
into the matter. Stern, a West German weekly magazine, claimed 
it had obtained evidence showing that Imhausen-Chemie had 
provided Libya with "everything that was needed to build a chem-
icals factory." 137 
The next day, the change in the West German position became 
even more pronounced when a Belgian shipping agent was ar-
friend Qadhafi with chemical arms." Id. (quoting from an editorial in the daily Neue 
Osnabriicker Zeitung). 
U2 Schmemann, Bonn Asks U.S. for Evidence of Libya Connection, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1989, 
at 4, col. 3. 
mId. 
Ig4 Markham, Among Europeans, Less Skepticism, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1989, at AI0, col. 
4. 
mId.; O'Boyle, Bonn Sets Probe of German Role in Libyan Plant, Wall St. J., Jan. 12, 1989, 
at A12, col. 6. 
136 McCartney, Bonn Links 2 Firms to Unauthorized Exports to Libya, Wash. Post, Jan. 12, 
1989, at A29, col. 6. 
mId.; Schmemann, Bonn Relents Somewhat on U.S. Charges, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1989, 
at AI0, col. 1. . 
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rested for allegedly disguising a shipment of West German goods 
that were ultimately sent to Libya. 138 The. Bonn government re-
acted by announcing that it was intensifying its own investigation 
into the matter. 139 Two weeks later, West German customs offi-
cials searched three companies for evidence of their complicity 
in building the Rabta facility.140 Among those searched were Im-
hausen-Chemie. According to one account, an employee of Im-
hausen-Chemie told Stern that a state owned West German com-
pany prepared blueprints to build the Rabta facility for 
Imhausen-Chemie. 141 The West German government was thereby 
implicated directly in the growing scandal. 
Finally, on February 16, 1989, the West German government 
issued a report acknowledging that it had information as early as 
July 1985 which indicated that Imhausen-Chemie was helping to 
construct a chemical weapons plant in Libya. 142 At a press con-
ference, Wolfgang Schaeuble, Chancellor Kohl's chief of staff, 
stated that the West German government believed that Libya 
intended to build a chemical weapons plant at Rabta since 1985. 143 
According to the report, however, even though the West German 
government had this information since 1985, Chancellor Kohl 
and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher were not informed 
until more than three years later. 144 
After issuing the report, the West German government contin-
ued to investigate the matter. On May 10, 1989, the West German 
government arrested Jurgen Hippenstiel-Imhausen, who had 
been director of Imhausen-Chemie until March when he resigned 
because of the scandal.'45 The West German prosecutor stated 
that Mr. Hippenstiel-Imhausen was "strongly suspected of having 
138 Schmemann, Belgian Charged in Illicit Shipment for Libyan Plant, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 
1989, at AI, col. 6. 
139Id. 
140 Schmemann, Bonn Raids 3 Concerns in Libya Plant Inquiry, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1989, 
at A8, col. 1; Roth, German Police Confiscate Files in Libya Probe, Wall St. j., Jan. 26, 1989, 
at All, col. 1. 
141 McCartney, W. Germans Seize Export Documents, Wash. Post, Jan. 26, 1989, at A19, 
col. 3. 




145 Protzman, German Seized in Libyan Chemical Case, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1989, at A14, 
col. 1; McCartney, Bonn Arrests Suspect in Libyan Deal, Washington Post, May 11, 1989, at 
A40, col. 1; Libyan Chemical Plant's Suspected Supplier Jailed, Wash. Times, May 11, 1989, 
at A8, col. 1. 
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played a significant personal role in the planning and building 
of a plant designed for the production of chemical weapons in 
Rabta, Libya. We believe he acted as a sort of moderator for the 
project."146 
This episode demonstrates that there is very strong evidence 
that the plant at Rabta is, in fact, designed to manufacture chem-
ical weapons. The United States initially stood alone in accusing 
Libya of building such a plant. Steadily, however, the nations of 
Western Europe, including Great Britain, the Netherlands, and 
France, all became persuaded by the evidence. 147 Even the West 
Germans eventually acknowledged the actual existence and de-
signed function of the plant, much to the extreme embarrassment 
of the Kohl government. It is highly unlikely that Chancellor 
Kohl would have voluntarily subjected himself to such ridicule if 
the evidence regarding the plant was not compelling. In sum, 
there are significant reasons to conclude that, at least until early 
1989, the Rabta facility was designed to manufacture chemical 
weapons. 
B. The Threat Posed by the Rabta Plant 
The newspaper stories published in early 1989 repeated U.S. 
government analyses that the Rabta plant was almost complete. 
Whether or not that is still the case is not clear. One report claims 
that American officials believe that Colonel Qadhafi is refitting 
the plant to make pharmaceuticals instead of chemical weapons 
as a result of diplomatic pressure and to obtain a propaganda 
coup by inviting independent experts to inspect the revamped 
facility.148 In contrast, however, Director of Central Intelligence 
William H. Webster testified to Congress that "Libya's chemical 
agent plant is expected to soon begin large-scale production of 
mustard and nerve agents, potentially tens of tons per day."149 
Whichever version is accurate, it should be obvious that it would 
146 Protzman, supra note 145, at A14, col. 1. 
147 Gordon, Soviets Dispute U.S. Assertion on Libya Plant, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1989, at 1, 
col. 1; Markham, supra note 134, at AlO, col. 4. 
148 Engleberg, Libyans May Make Drugs After All, N.V. Times, Mar. 2, 1989, at A17, col. 
1; see Fialka, Libyan Gas Plant Nears Production, U.S. Officials Say, Wall St. j., Feb. 13, 1989, 
at A12, col. 5. 
149 Chemical Weapons Proliferation, Testimony of William H. Webster, Director of Central 
Intelligence, Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mar. 1, 1989 (NEXIS, 
Federal News Service library). 
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be relatively easy to make the plant capable of completing its 
original purpose: the manufacture of chemical weapons. 
Having determined the plant'S potential, the chief inquiry must 
be into the nature of the threat such a plant poses. American 
analysts claim that the potential output of the plant is between 
22,000 and 84,000 pounds of mustard gas and nerve agent daily. 
In comparison, the chemical weapons plants Iraq used to produce 
the weapons used against Iran produced less than 10,000 pounds 
daily. ISO According to government officials, only 3,000 pounds is 
needed to cover a square mile. 151 Thus, the plant appears to have 
a frightening capability to manufacture significant quantities of 
chemical weapons. 
This manufacturing capability is particularly threatening in 
light of Libya'S efforts to develop a delivery capability. According 
to American officials, Libya is attempting to acquire refueling 
capacity for its air force which would place several targets 
throughout North Africa, brael, and the Arab world in jeop-
ardy.ls2 These efforts have become even more disturbing with 
the disclosure that six sophisticated Soviet Su-24D bombers have 
been delivered to Libya. 153 It is not clear, however, whether these 
Soviet bombers have a refueling capability. 
Colonel Qadhafi's efforts to develop a delivery system have not 
been limited to aircraft. According to a 1988 report, U.S. officials 
believe that the Colonel is trying to obtain ballistic missiles with 
a range of up to 3,000 miles. ls4 In light of the U.S. conclusion 
that the Rabta facility may be capable of producing not only 
chemical weapons but also artillery shells and missile casings to 
contain them,155 it becomes apparent that Qadhafi plans to de-
velop a medium range delivery system capable of threatening all 
of the Middle East and Western Europe and parts of Africa. 
150 Engleberg & Gordon, supra note I, at A I, col. I. 
151 Id. For a more extensive discussion about the effects of chemical weapons, and the 
efforts to prohibit their use, see generally Note, International Regulation of Chemiml and 
Biological Weapons: Yellow Rain and Arms Control, U. ILL. L. REV. 1011 (1984); Note, 
Establishing Fiolations of International Law: 'Yellow Rain' ([nd the Treaties Rl'gulating Chemi((ll 
and Biological Warfare, 35 STAN. L. REV. 259 (1983). 
152 Engleberg & Gordon, supra note I, at A I, col. I. 
153 Wayne, U.S. Ganging Soviet hlttnt After Bomber Salts to Libya, Christian Sci. Pub. Soc'y, 
Apr. 12, 1989. 
154 Fialka, Chemical Wea/JI!ns Spread in Third World, Pose Clial/mge to West, Wall St. J., Sept. 
15, 1988, at I, col. I. 
155 Engleberg & Gordon, .Ill/Ira note I, at ;\ I, col. I. 
1990] INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 81 
The question remains, however, whether Qadhafi would use 
such weapons if they are fully developed. State Department 
spokesman Charles Redman claimed that in light of Libya's re-
ported use of poison gas against neighboring Chad in 1987, 
Qadhafi has developed a "track record."156 Even more worrisome 
from the American perspective, according to Redman, is Qad-
hafi's "record of irresponsible behavior" in supporting interna-
tional terrorism. 157 The United States, therefore, fears that Qad-
hafi will manufacture the chemical weapons and then provide 
them to international terrorists. Indeed, according to L. Paul 
Bremer, Director of the State Department's Office of Counte~­
terrorism, the United States Intelligence Community estimates a 
fifty percent chance that international terrorists will escalate their 
efforts to include chemical weapons in the next two years. 158 
If the Rabta plant becomes operational and Libya develops a 
delivery system, then the weapons could be used against Ameri-
ca's allies in the Middle East, such as Israel and Egypt, and also 
against Western Europe. The weapons could also be used to 
attack American ships and personnel in the area, particularly 
those who patrol the Mediterranean. One can easily imagine a 
repeat of the Gulf of Sidra incidentl59 involving the use of bomb-
ers and missiles carrying chemical weapons. Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, Qadhafi could provide the chemical weapons 
to the numerous terrorist groups that he supports, many of which 
have engaged in gruesome attacks on Americans. Such use of 
chemical weapons would allow Colonel Qadhafi to fulfill his 
pledge of taking terrorism to America's streets. 
The potential threat to U.S. national security, therefore, is 
significant. Whether that threat is immediate, however, is impos-
sible to determine without more concrete and current informa-
tion on the plant's capabilities and Colonel Qadhafi's intentions. 
Conceivably, reports on the plant'S potential may be inaccurate, 
and the plant may be capable of producing only pharmaceuticals. 
As well, Colonel Qadhafi may have intended to build the plant 
only as a threat to America and others and not to produce and 
156 Beeston, Libya Constructs Chemical Weapons Plant. U.S. Says, Wash. Times, Sept. IS, 
1988, at A8, col. 4. 
157 Ottaway, U.S. Says Libya Near Chemical Weapon Production, Wash. Post, Sept. IS, 1988, 
at AI9, col. 1. 
158 Beecher, Odds of Terrorists Using Gas Put at 50-50, Minneapolis Star Tribune, Feb. 7, 
1989, at 4, col. I. 
159 See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text. 
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use chemical weapons. The Colonel's intentions are difficult to 
ascertain. While it may be possible to assess accurately the capa-
bilities of the plant, deciphering the Colonel's intentions would 
frustrate even the most perceptive analyst. Such an exercise 
merely demonstrates that, in this age of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, nations must take care to mean what they say and do as they 
intend, for other nations will look to their words and acts as 
evidence of true intentions and react accordingly. The Israeli raid 
on Osiraq demonstrates this lesson well. Bombing the reactor was 
a reasonable reaction by Israel to the threat it faced but attacking 
the Rabta facility does not seem to be a reasonable option for the 
United States at this time. 
C. International Law and the United States' Reaction to the Rabta 
Threat 
The United States apparently has employed a tripartite strategy 
in response to the developments at Rabta. First, the United States 
has encouraged the international community, including Libya, to 
agree on a new international convention that would prohibit the 
manufacture of chemical weapons. Second, the United States has 
tried to convince its European allies that the Rabta plant is a 
chemical weapons facility and that they ought to prohibit their 
domestic companies from participating in the plant's construc-
tion. Third, the United States has used the threat of military 
action to persuade Qadhafi to cease construction of the facility. 
1. An International Agreement 
The disclosures about the Rabta facility in early 1989 occurred 
at about the same time that the world's nations were planning to 
meet in Paris to discuss chemical weapons in general. 160 The 
United States organized the conference in response to the use of 
chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war.161 During the conference, 
the United States argued that Libya's potential to produce chem-
ical weapons poses a unique menace to the world community, 
especially in light of Libya's support of international terrorism. 162 
160 Pear, supra note 1, at AI, col. 6. 
161 See id. 
162 See Gordon, Paris Conference Condemns the Use of Chemical Arms, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 
1989, at AI, col. 1; Markham, War and Finger-Pointing, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1989, at AI, 
col. 1. 
/ 
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In response to the U.S. argument, Libya continued to insist on 
its right to manufacture chemical weapons so long as other na-
tions do so. "How can any member of the international commu-
nity proclaim a right it denies others?" asked the Libyan Foreign 
Minister, J addallah Azauz al-Talhi. 163 The United States re-
sponded by asserting, in effect, that even though the developed 
nations of the West possess chemical weapons, they can be trusted 
not to use them while others, such as Libya and Iraq, cannot. 164 
The Conference concluded with mixed results. While no inter-
national agreement to prohibit the manufacture of chemical 
weapons was reached, the Conference did issue a declaration that 
called for: 
the necessity of concluding, at an early date, a convention on 
the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling 
and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction. 
This convention shall be global and comprehensive and ef-
fectively verifiable. It should be of unlimited duration. 165 
The world community thus agreed to agree on some new con-
vention at a future date. 166 But, like agreements to agree in the 
domestic context, such aspirational documents have little or no 
effect. 
The U.S. international effort, therefore, cannot be considered 
much of a success. While the Conference did focus the world's 
attention on the problem, the absence of any new binding inter-
national agreement, or even a general reprimand of Libya re-
garding the construction of its plant at Rabta, epitomizes the 
difficulties of achieving an international consensus on the issue. 
Similarly, reliance on the United Nations to sanction Libya or to 
otherwise prevent the completion of the Rabta plant would not 
163 Gordon, Libya Says It Can Make Chemical Arms if Others Do, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1989, 
at A12, col. 3. 
164 Markham, supra note 162, at A13, col. 6. 
165 Text of the Declaration from the Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons, N.Y. Times, Jan. 
12, 1989, at AIO, col. 1. 
166 The most promising international agreement on chemical weapons currently is the 
Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. 156 U.N. Doc. CD/500 (1974). 
Progress in 1987 on the convention's verification provisions and the challenge inspection 
process seemed to indicate that "most of the [convention's] remaining problems were 
mainly legal and technical." U.N. DEP'T FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, FACT SHEET No. 65, 
at 15 (1989). In 1988, further progress was made. See id. at 16. Negotiations on the Draft 
Convention are next scheduled to resume in Geneva in November 1989 and conclude in 
Fedruary 1990. Report of the Conference on Disarmament, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 27) at 
48, U.N. Doc. A/44/27 (1989). 
84 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XIII, No.1 
be successful. By attempting to address the perceived threat in 
an international forum, however, the United States has gone far 
towards meeting its international obligation to settle this dispute 
in a peaceful manner. 
2. The United States and Its Allies 
The second part of the U.S. strategy also suggests that the 
United States has tried to meet its obligation to try and settle its 
dispute with Libya peacefully. Specifically, the United States has 
attempted to convince its allies that the Rabta plant is being 
constructed to manufacture chemical weapons and to prevent 
their domestic companies from participating in the effort. The 
American theory is based on the premise that Libya does not 
have the technical capability for completing the plant on its own 
and that even if Libya did have such capability, the very with-
drawal of foreign support would significantly complicate and 
impede the Libyan effort. 167 This part of the American strategy 
has been difficult but ultimately successful. From an almost unan-
imous skepticism or rejection of the U.S. claims about Rabta, 
America's allies were slowly but steadily persuaded by the United 
States that the plant would produce chemical weapons. The 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Canada, and France eventu-
ally discarded their initial skepticism and publicly announced that 
they were convinced by the United States of the plant's capabili-
ties. 16S The West Germans changed their position completely, 
much to their chagrin and embarrassment. 
The significance of this effort lies in the fact that not only West 
German companies helped construct the Rabta plant. Although 
West German companies may have given the most substantial 
assistance, according to Deputy National Security Advisor Robert 
M. Gates, the plant was being built with the help of companies 
from "nearly a dozen nations, East and West."169 Presumably, 
these companies were pressured, like the West German company, 
to cease their efforts supporting construction of the Rabta plant 
once the true nature of the facility was accepted by their countries' 
governments. Indeed, this may have been a major factor in per-
167 Engleberg & Gordon, supra note I, at AI, col. 1. 
168 Gordon, supra note 147, at I, col. 1; Markham, supra note 134, at AlO, col. 4. 
169 Engleberg & Gordon, supra note I, at AI, col. 1. 
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suading Colonel Qadhafi to abandon his plans for the plant if, in 
fact, he has done so. 
In view of U.S. attempts to prohibit chemical weapons produc-
tion by treaty, as well as efforts to coordinate the policies of its 
European allies, it js clear that the United States has embraced 
multilateral diplomacy as a means to settle this dispute peacefully. 
It is not clear, however, that the United States has sought a 
bilateral solution with equal energy. If developments occur ne-
cessitatipg an attack, the United States should first attempt to 
undertake a diplomatic initiative with Libya, either directly or 
through an intermediary. 
3. The American Threat of Force 
The U.S. response to the threat has not been entirely peaceful. 
On January 4, 1989, a U.S. Navy strike force comprised of eigh-
teen ships, including a thirteen ship Navy carrier group and a 
five ship Marine battle group, sailed towards Libya. 170 Reportedly, 
officials at the Pentagon and. the Central Intelligence Agency 
favored a military strike using cruise missiles because the missiles 
are accurate and their use would avoid the death or capture of 
any military personnel. l7l 
This military capability became an effective threat when it was 
preceded by careful preparatory remarks made by President Rea-
gan. When asked by a reporter whether the United States might 
bomb the plant at Rabta, President Reagan replied: "Well, let me 
say that's a decision that has not been made yet, we're in com-
munication with our allies and with NATO forces and all, and 
we're watching very closely that situation but even if I had made 
a decision I couldn't [disclose it]."172 The strike force, however, 
was ultimately withdrawn without attacking the Rabta plant. 
V. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND A FUTURE ATTACK ON THE RABTA 
FACILITY 
At the present time, publicly disclosed information on the 
Rabta plant's capabilities and Colonel Qadhafi's intentions for its 
use do not support a lawful attack by the United States under 
any theory of self-defense. No armed attack has occurred as 
170 Almond & Gertz, supra note 5, at AI, col. 3. 
171Id. 
17. Cannon & Ottaway, supra note I, at AI, col. 1. 
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required by article 51 of the Charter. Similarly, though the plant 
indeed poses an identifiable potential threat to U.S. national se-
curity, the threat does not appear as immediate as required by 
the Caroline Doctrine. Finally, despite the actual perception by 
the United States of the plant's potential threat and the reason-
ableness of that perception in light of recent U.S.-Libyan rela-
tions, the threat posed does not rise to a level that allows an attack 
under the modern theory of anticipatory self-defense. 
Future developments, however, may make the information dis-
closed thus far useful in supporting a lawful attack on the Rabta 
plant. Specifically, if the United States obtains confirmed reports 
that the plant is operational to manufacture chemical weapons, 
that Libya has developed a delivery capability, and that Qadhafi 
intends to use the weapons directly or indirectly against the 
United States, then the United States may be able to lawfully 
attack the plant under the theory of anticipatory self-defense. 
Analysis of such an attack under each of the theories of self-
defense demonstrates that only the theory of anticipatory self-
defense allows the United States to adequately defend itself in 
anticipation of a chemical weapons attack. 
Under the traditional restrictive theory of self-defense under 
the United Nations Charter, the United States would have to wait 
for the "armed attack" from Libya to occur first.173 The potential 
devastation of such an attack, however, makes this wait and see 
approach clearly unacceptable. Another option for the United 
States is to justify an attack under the traditional theory of antic-
ipatory self-defense. Under the Caroline Doctrine, the United 
States would have to wait until the threat posed by Libya is 
"instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, or no 
moment for deliberation."174 Yet, the problems in applying this 
formulation to the potential use of chemical weapons should be 
obvious. How does a state determine when the standard has been 
met? There is no precise calculation that can be employed. A 
miscalculation regarding the possible use of a weapon of such 
mass destruction could result in the needless deaths of millions 
of the defending state's own citizens. Requiring a state to wait 
until confronted with an imminent chemical weapons attack be-
173 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
174 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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fore lawfully employing force in self-defense seems unacceptable 
in light of the magnitude and uncertainty of risks. Adoption, 
however, of the modern theory of anticipatory self-defense and 
its standard of reasonableness 175 would allow the United States 
to meet its minimum national security requirements and, at the 
same time, ensure that the use of force is necessary under the 
circumstances. 
The United States would not have to sustain an armed attack 
before acting to prevent future attacks. Nor would the United 
States have to wait until the possibility of the attack was so im-
mediate that a failure to successfully extinguish the threat would 
result in great losses. Rather, under the modern theory of antic-
ipatory self-defense, the United States could preempt a planned 
chemical weapons attack when the threat to its national security 
arises but well before its national security is placed in imminent 
jeopardy. Further information may lead U.S. policymakers to 
reasonably conclude that the plant is producing chemical weapons 
and that Libya has attained a delivery capability especially when 
viewed in light of the plant's original design. Similarly, further 
information suggesting Libya intends to use such weapons against 
the United States would be consistent with recent relations be-
tween the United States and Libya. Thus, the foundation is laid 
for a reasonable perception of a threat to U.S. national security. 
Force reasonably used to suppress that threat would seem lawful 
under the modern theory of anticipatory self-defense. 
Adoption of this theory of self-defense bridges the gap between 
the failed collective security system and the overly strict require-
ment of article 51 of the Charter. Volatile and unpredictable 
leaders like Colonel Qadhafi add uncertainty in policy decisions 
regarding national security. The United States may not be able 
to wait until it has overwhelming evidence of the plant's capabil-
ities and Qadhafi's intentions. It certainly cannot wait for the 
Security Council to act. The margin for error is small, and the 
consequences of mistaken inaction are unacceptable. Instead, the 
United States may have to act in reasonable anticipation of an 
eventual attack like Israel did in 1981. Even though the United 
States condemned Israel for its attack on Osiraq in 1981, the 
American bombing of Tripoli in 1986 demonstrates that the 
175 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
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United States accepts the practice, and presumably the modern 
theory, of anticipatory self-defense. 
VI. REFLECTIONS ON THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 
POLICYMAKING PROCESS 
But if the United States does act, it should be done with prin-
ciples of international law in mind. Many military commanders 
often scoff at the role international law plays in the national 
security policymaking process. Despite such rebukes, however, 
international law consistently shapes the political parameters of 
the inevitable debate about a particular use of force. When Israel 
bombed Osiraq in 1981, its actions were debated in the United 
Nations. Israel and, to a lesser extent, Iraq presented legal ar-
guments about the validity of the attack. Although the Security 
Council condemned Israel (wrongly, in the opinion of some) for 
the attack, it did so while the political debate was shaped by legal 
parameters. 
Similarly, when the United States bombed Tripoli in 1986, the 
United States was prepared with legal support for the attack as 
soon as the attack was disclosed. At his press conference, Presi-
dent Reagan explained that the attack carried out by the United 
States in self-defense was lawful under the United Nations 
Charter. The American Ambassador to the United Nations, Ver-
non Walters, presented a subsequent legal defense to the United 
Nations. 
In sum, if the United States ever does plan to attack the Rabta 
plant, it needs to prepare a legal defense in advance or suffer 
more criticism from the international community than it other-
wise would. Compiling and disclosing such a record is often dif-
ficult, as demonstrated in the attempt to persuade West Germany 
about its citizens' involvement in the Rabta facility, because it may 
involve revealing intelligence sources and methods. The United 
States Intelligence Community, which takes the long-term view, 
is very reluctant to disclose such information because of its impact 
on America's national security. But in certain circumstances, 
where the stakes are sufficiently high, the United States should 
be prepared to make such disclosures. If the threat posed by 
Rabta is or becomes so significant that the United States govern-
ment concludes that it must attack, then decisionmakers who 
order the attack should be prepared to support it factually and 
legally. The increasing interdependence of the international com-
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munity demands and deserves such an explanation. Without an 
explanation, any such use of force properly should be con-
demned. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Because of the lack of publicly disclosed information about the 
status of the Rabta facility and Qadhafi's intentions for it, it is 
impossible at the present time to conclude with any degree of 
certainty about whether the United States could lawfully attack 
the plant. If such an attack eventually occurs, the United States 
should be prepared to justify the threat it perceived from the 
Rabta facility and why that perception was reasonable. Whether 
or not that argument is persuasive could determine the lawfulness 
of the attack and the eventual evaluation by the international 
community. 
